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FAITH AND SILENCE IN PLAT01S GORGlAS

A

THE CLIMAX of his dispute with Socrates over the
nature of man Callicles refuses to go on answering
Socrates's questions and stands silent while Socrates
recapitulates and finishes the argument alone ( Gorgias, 506c509) . Throughout the rest of the dialogue Callicles remains
recalcitrant, breaking his silence only to sneer at Socrates or
continue perfunctorily a conversation in which he has obviously
little interest. At first glance Callicles's silence seems to
represent the stubborn embarrassment of a man who knows he
is defeated, but is refusing to admit it. He had maintained the
profligate's thesis that the good for man is identical with states
of pleasure but has been led by Socrates to admit the need for
self-control guided by knowledge of the difference between good
and evil pleasures and pains (499b) . Now, with Callicles silent,
and at the urging of Gorgias himself, Socrates goes on to complete the argument by supplying the ultimate standard by
which men are to distinguish good from evil pleasures and
pains-the wisdom which has guided his every word in his three
conversations with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles: "Wise men
say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held
together by the principles of sharing, by friendship and order,
by self-control and justice,, (508} . But clearly this conclusion
goes beyond the premise Callicles has agreed to; Callicles could
grant the need for self-control while logically refusing to place
it at the service of friendship, the particular standard announced by Socrates: the tyrant too knows self-discipline. This
insight that Callicles stands on firm ground in his silence can
help to interpret this dramatic incident in Plato's Gorgias. By
making a point of Callicles's silence during Socrates's declaration of his ultimate wisdom Plato provides, not a signal of
!!87
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Callicles's defeat, but the appropriate counter-declaration of
the tyrannical soul.
To be sure, Callicles shifts his position during his conversation with Socrates, but his movement is steadily away from
Socrates until in his silence he stands exposed as the exact opposite of Socrates. This movement occurs in three main steps
as Socrates presses for clari£cation of Callicles's initial assertion that" nature herself reveals it to be only just and proper
that the better man should lord it over his inferior . . . the
stronger over the weaker " (483d) . In the first step Socrates
leads Callicles to dismiss as better or stronger the mass of men
which has the actual physical strength of numbers (488c-489d) .
Second, he leads Callicles to dismiss as better or stronger the
fools and cowards whose desire is for mere]y bodily pleasure
(494b-499b) . It is at this point that Callicles admits the need
!or self-control. The third and final step in Callicles's moveTD.~nt of self-clarification is his silence itself: by the better,
.'ltronger man Callicles means ultimately himself as opposed
to all other men. His silence asserts his character itself, the unsharable truth, which he alone can fully understand and appreciate, that he is the master and all other men his slaves.
Callicles is the despotic soul whose portrait Plato draws so
vividly too in the Republic, that .soul whose hitherto disparate
appetites for fragmentary pleasures have come to be ruled by
the " great winged drone," the insatiable master passion for
power which takes as reality the lunatic's dream of lording it
over all mankind and heaven besides (R epublic, 572) .
The clarification of Callicles as residing ultimately in the
tacit commitment to his tyranny over others is to be contrasted
with the movements of self-clarification undergone in Socrates's
presence by the two previous speakers in the dialogue, Gorgias
and Polus. For the main line of meaning in the dialogue runs
from the opening question about who Gorgias is (447d) to
the final revelation in Callicles's silence of the distorted depths
of Gorgias's own soul.
In the opening conversation Gorgias falls into a self-contra-
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diction when he both disclaims responsibility for the injustices
of his students and yet claims that his students become just
men in his presence (451h-461): he both does and does not
make just men of those who come under his influence. This
contradiction, which lies at the core of Gorgias's personality,
rises to the surface under the pressure of the questioning
presence of Socrates. In being ashamed to admit to Socrates
that he is not an example of human excellence to his students
Gorgias in effect confesses his own deeepest aspiration. In his
shame in the presence of Socrates Gorgias has made contact
with his own humanity, and now, while others speak he remains
in t he background following the argument intensely, so intensely that he will urge Socrates to continue when Callicles falls
silent. The event of " conversion" in the presence of Socrates
is now repeated in the next conversation between Socrates and
Gorgias's student P olus.
Polus admires the tyrant, and in order to refute Socrates's
contention that tyrants are unhappy and powerless because
they cannot fulfill their own deepest desire to be just men he
first cites historical cases of self-satisfied tyranny (470c-471d)
and then invites Socrates to ask the opinions of those listening
to their conversation (47Se) . Socrates, however, would produce but one witness to the truth, Polus himself (474), and
he asks P olus whether it is uglier to do or to 5Uffer injustice
(474b). Polus responds that doing injustice is uglier than
suffering it, but, as Socrates helps him see, by ugly he really
means evil, and so in fact he himself does agree with Socrates
that tyrannical action contradicts a man's own good. In Polus's
abrupt about-face we once again glimpse Socrates performing
the eminently just action of education for which he was condemned. With his question as to whether doing or suffering
injustice is uglier he has lilted Polus out of the context of
mutual reprisal, where tyranny might be considered excusable
as the fitting response forced upon one by the threats of others,
and has placed before him the entire spectacle of mutual invasion itself, asking him whether it suits his own aspiration for
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fulfillment, whether Polus himself could initiate the violence.
When Polus responds, face to face with Socrates, that to do so
would be ugly he expresses the distance between himself and
tyrannical self-assertion. Beneath his superficial admiration of
the tyrant Polus is revulsed by tyrannical action. Socrates's
questioning presence has touched t his nerve of Polus's humanity, as it had touched that of Gorgias before him, bringing
him to life as a man.
To be sure, we are not to make too much of P olus's conversion. His tone throughout his conversation with Socrates indicates clearly that he is well on the way toward becoming
like Callicles, the next speaker, who will interpret Polus's admission t hat tyranny is ugly as influenced not by Polus's nature but by convention (48~d). By bracketing Polus's admission bet ween Gorgias's more positive eagerness to dissociate
himself from injustice and Callides's more deadly silence Plato
has bot h fixed Polus at the mid-point on a scale of growing insensitivity to Socratic friendship and has suggested his movement from Gorgias, the teacher, to Callicles, the thoroughly
corrupt product of Gorgias's teaching. Polus's confrontation
with Socrates jolts him off course only momentarily. Socrates
too is on the way toward Callicles, the human type that will
condemn him for corrupting the youth, and he has not enough
time remaining to help Polus establish this newly awakened
revulsion at evil as the ruling passion of his soul.
The conversions undergone by both Gorgias and Polus in the
presence of Socrates bring into sharp relief Plato's intention
in having Callicles be silent during the speech in which Socrates
links self-control to friendship. Face to face with Socrates, at
the same point at which Gorgias was overcome with shame and
P olus experienced revulsion at initiating the violence, Callicles
remains rooted in that unregenerate commitment to tyrannical
self-assertion for which silence is the appropriate expression.
Callicles loves violating other men, loves tyranny for its own
sake. Socrates had already recognized this loving commitment
of Callicles's when in his first speech to Callicles he stressed
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that both of them are lovers, he of wisdom, Callicles of power
(481c). And now, in Callicles's silence during Socrates's declaration of friendship, Socrates cannot but hear Callicles's
counter-declaration that self-controlled dedication to principle
is as much a part of t he life of tyranny as of the life of friendship. In Callicles's silence Socrates's self-disciplined friendship
confronts an equally self-disciplined, unyielding, love of tyrannical power, Plato pours into his construction of this confrontation his own recognition of the purity, the spirituality if you
will, of the love of tyranical power, which is in every way the
matching opposite of the Socratic love of friendship.
This suggestion that Callicles and Socrates are spiritual counterparts implies that in the conversation between them every
key concept-nature, convention, freedom, power, happiness,
justice, friendship, speech, etc.-has an opposite meaning depending upon whether Socrates or Callicles defines it. But in
the remarks that follow I will seek to secure, not the opposite
meanings of each of these specific concepts, but rather the general framework which contains them all, the spirituality
Socrates and Callicles have in common, as well as the point at
which they come into opposition. To this end it will be helpful
to characterize briefly the human condition which elicits from
both the fundamentally human spiritual response.
Socrates and Callicles have in common what all men have
in common by virtue of the human condition itself, namely, the
issue of staying in contact with the truth of the world. That
a man's fundamental issue is contact with the truth of the world
is strikingly expressed by Plato himself in his fable of the human puppets in the Laws (644d) : The situation of every man
is t hat of a puppet whose opposed interior states pull him
like cords toward opposite actions, the gentle tug of the golden
cord of judgment toward citizenship, the violent, iron-like tugs
of private pleasure and pain toward self-assertion. For our
present purpose the importance of Plato's image of the puppets
lies not in its location of every man between citizenship and
self-assertion, but in its poignant depiction of every man's situa-

242

KEITH ALGOZIN

tion of being open to a world whose ultimate meaning is unknown: like puppets we lack the puppet master's knowledge
of the meaning of the show. Sensing that something is at stake
in our lives but uncertain as to what it is, we do not know how
to perform so as not to spoil the play. It is this specifically human condition of ignorance about the meaning of the whole
which places every man in the distinctively spiritual issue of
locating and maintaining contact with the truth which governs,
not just this or that part of the world, but the world entire.
For within the ignorance of the ultimate meaning of the world
there lurks the horror of unattunement with the world, the
horror of doing what violates the truth of the world or what
is trivial, accidental, passing, as against what is substantial or
enduring because it is the ultimate meaning, or purpose, which
holds sway throughout the world itself. This horror of unattunement with the world can be dispelled only by the belief
that one is performing in one's every action the ultimate task
which the world itseli essentially is and which all things in the
world are called to enact so that, as in a well-formed play, every
part achieves in the manner appropriate to it the proper attunement of all to all. In such perfectly attuned action, which
is the spiritual goal that the human condition of ignorance sets
before every man, a man would be alive in the properly human
essence: that of himself which should rule his life would be
actually ruling that of himself which should be subordinate,
and he would be the rightly ordered place through which the
work of the world is done as it ought to be done by a man in
the world. Here a man would be representative of all mankind
in the sense of a revelation to all men of the meaning of being
human in the world. And now, Plato would have us understand, I believe, that both Socrates and Callicles are men of
such spiritual commitment, men whose self-discipline stems
ultimately from the effort to maintain and represent man's
proper attunement to the world. By letting Callicles be silent
during Socrates's statement of his wisdom, and by doing so
against the background of the contrasting assent by Gorgias
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and P olus to the spiritual force of Socrates's personality~ Plato
effectively suggests that Socrates and Callicles are two equally
fo rceful spiritual claims to be the model or representative man
whom all other men are to pattern themselves upon in order
to come alive in their properly human nature and stand in the
truth of the world.
But, while Socrates and Callicles are equally spiritual through
their common concern to be the properly ordered, representatively human place through which the truth of the world flows
among men, this truth itself differs radically in each case. For
Socrates "heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together
by the principles of sharing, by friendship and order, by selfcontrol and justice." And, in the face of Callicles's silence, he
goes on: " that, my friend, is the reason wise men call the
universe cosmos, and not disorder or licentiousness." The
wholeness of the universe of existing things, the ground which
is itself no existent thing among others but which embracingly
binds all existent things into a whole, is the event of friendship,
the event of each thing being most itself by drawing the others
into their proper pa1·tnership in the whole, their capacity to
create the whole by evoking this capacity in still others, so that
all things are engaged in mutually eliciting, or enlivening, each
other's capacity to form a whole in which all co-exist as partners in simultaneous fulfillment. Just as the gods, the powers
of nature, form the immortal natural cosmos by mutually
evoking each other's partnership in the whole, so too men are
to form the city in the image of this natural cosmos by mutually evoking each other's power to be citizens. And, as we have
glimpsed in Socrates's encounters with Gorgias and Polus,
Socrates himself is the place where this essence of the world occurs among men: Socrates fulfills himself by drawing from
Gorgias and Polus their own capacity to fulfill themselves in
community with Socrates. Such educative friendship is Socrates's very attunement to the essence of the universe. Who
he is is the true statesman (5!21d), the human image of the
ground, the unbiased meeting point wherein all things can in-
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tersect as mutually fulfilling, intercommunicating partners in
the creation of a self-enlivening public order. His life is this
event of evoking in others the moral agency which is their own
capacity to create and maintain the city, i.e., evoke it in still
others. Such friendship, the mutual creation of the city in time
in the image of Socrates, who images the gods, who image the
eternal ground, is truly human life. And in this context
Callicles's silent, self-assertive rebellion against the divine in
man is a living human death.
For Callicles, on the other hand, the universe of existent
things is essentially disorder, strife, the war of everything
against every other thing in which each thing's unsharable fulfillment-mastery-is each other thing's unfuliillment-slavery.
To be sure, from within Callicle.s's own private, egoistic perspective, all things appea.r as facets of an ordered whole: each thing
is an instrument for furthering his own mastery over others.
But when Callicles universalizes this egoism, attributing it to
all, he must find between himse]f and others, not Socrates's selfenlivening community, but rather the precisely opposite event
of an explosion into nothing, each part's tyranny over the others
eliciting, as in the game of hands upon hands, the other's
tyranny over it-a mutually heightening fragmentation whose
outer limit is the chaos of part outside part outside part. In
this Calliclesian universe Socratic friendship is seen as merely
a surface phenomenon, at best our unstable contract to use
each other for the time against a common enemy, be it physical
nature or a group of still other men. The last word of all friendship, however, is Callicles's own silence, the mute, self-disciplined violation of each other which enacts, in the image of
Callicles himself, the truth of the world that mind succumbs to
the divisive onslaught of blind, silent matter.
Thus, as Callicles and Socrates stand facing each other,
Callicles silent, Socrates declaring the truth of frendship, each
is accusing the other of having "turned human life completely
upside down" (481b); each is the spiritual appeal to the other
to awaken from dream and come alive in genuinely human at-
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tunement to the real world. Moreover, as Plato's image of the
puppets suggests, this issue between Socrates and Callicles is
the issue of every man. Each of us may experience the issue
in that moment of confrontation with the other man when we
stand at once in the centripetal current which would absorb
him into ourselves without remainder and the centrifugal current which would sweep us toward him in friendship. In this
moment we know the opposed Calliclesian and Socratic tensions of our own soul and have ourselves as actors in the drama
of war and peace.
But perhaps-and I suggest this last point with hesitation
because Socrates seems so confident of his .. arguments of
adamant and steel" (509) -perhaps Plato has packed into this
incident in the Gorgias the still deeper meaning that in fact
Socrates does not know with certainty that he, not Callicles,
represents human nature. For Callicles's silence occurs against
the background of Socrates's earlier remark, made at the beginning of their conversation, that Callicles will be his touchstone, that if Socrates can bring Callicles to agree with him
then Socrates will know that his own soul is golden (486e).
Against this background Callicles's silence may represent the
counter-wisdom which Socrates fails to break, a failure which
exposes Plato's awareness of the crisis of faith which lies at
the core of his philosophy. Though Socrates-Plato's wisdom
rests firmly upon his own experiential self-knowledge of the
hierarchical order of rank of the powers of his own soul (his
conscience), it remains ultimately an act of faith made in the
face of the opposite possibility attested by Callicles-Plato in his
silence. After all, all knowledge waits upon confirmation from
the other's point of view, and this is especially the case for philosophy which seeks that wisdom about the whole which includes
the phenomena of human valuation itself. Here the testimony
of the other is especially crucial. What a man alone sees he
must doubt; he approaches certainty only if others can see it
too. Thus, only in dialogue can there be established the nature
of man as our clue to the nature of the universe, and in this
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dialogue Calliclesian silence, whether it stares back at one from
the other or surfaces in one's own soul, has a say. Hence the
power of Socrate.s's confrontation with Callicles's silence at
Gorgias 506c: the two opposed tugs in every man's soul offset each other, generating every man's deepest question;
Socrates is present as Plato's answer to this question, but this
answer requires a confirmation it does not receive. The reader
must himself enter into the dialogue about the nature of man.
KEITH ALGOZIN
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